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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
NARCOTICS ADDICT
The increase in the use of narcotics, especially among theyoung, has caused nationwide concern. Congress and state legis-latures alike have given considerable attention to the problem in an
attempt to curb addiction to narcotics. Both have imposed a myriad
of criminal sanctions on a wide spectrum of narcotics-related activ-ity. Despite a rational basis for these restrictions, it is the position
of this author that, absent evidence of trafficking,' the imposition of
criminal sanctions upon a narcotics addict for possession of a quan-tity of narcotics sufficient only for his daily use runs afoul of the
specific constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.
NATURE OF NARCOTICS ADDICTION
In their book on narcotics addiction, Doctors Maurer and Vogel
spoke of drug addiction "as a state in which a person has lost thepower of self-control with reference to a drug, and abuses the drugto such an extent that the person or society is harmed."2 The doctors
then pointed out that addiction implied a compulsive and repetitious
use of a drug. The harm done to a given individual would vary
with the degree of his personality disorder.'
Drug addicts were invariably found to possess the character-istics of tolerance, physical dependence, or habituation. Tolerance
represents the diminishing effect of a drug on repetitions of the
same dose.4 In other words, the addict has to increase his dosage togain the same effect. Physical dependence refers to an altered phys-iological state, brought on by repeated administration of a drug
over a long period of time. Continued use of the drug is necessaryto avoid the agony of withdrawal.' Finally, habituation entails an
emotional dependence on a drug. The user substitutes the use of a
1 The author's definition of narcotics "trafficking" is the possession, transporta-
tion, or importation of narcotics for purposes of sale; or the selling, administering,
furnishing, or giving away of narcotics.
2 D. MAURER & V. VOGEL, NARCOTICS AND NARCOTIC ADDICTION, 37 (3rd ed. 1967).
Maurer is a Professor of English and Humanities at the University of Louisville andformerly served as a lecturer on narcotics addiction for the Southern Police Institutein Louisville, Kentucky. Vogel is the Chairman of the California Narcotic AddictEvaluation Authority and was formerly the Medical Officer in Charge of the U.S.Public Health Service Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky.
8 Id. at 37.
4 Id. at 33.
5 Id.
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drug for other forms of adaptive behavior in order to cope with his
problem.'
Due to his physiological dependence,: the addict must, of neces-
sity, violate the law. Progressive courts and legislatures have recog-
nized that narcotics addiction7 is a disease and have treated the
addict as a person requiring medical assistance as opposed to penal
sanction.
THE ADDICT AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court dealt with a
California statute which made it a misdemeanor for any person to
be addicted to the use of narcotics.9 In that case, police officers had
occasion to examine the defendant's arms. The examination revealed
needle and scab marks which led to his arrest and ultimate con-
viction.'" At the trial, the judge instructed the jury to return a
verdict of guilty if it was proven either that the defendant used a
narcotic in Los Angeles County or that he was addicted to the use
of narcotics while he was in Los Angeles County."
6 Id. at 33, 37.
7 The United States Congress attempts to explain the derivation of narcotics in
its federal statute 21 U.S.C. § 501 (1961). Until recently, most narcotics were made
from natural raw materials such as the opium poppy and the coca leaf. However, due
to recent technological advances, new types of narcotic drugs have been synthetically
produced from a variety of raw materials.
The California legislature recognizes 13 classes of narcotic drugs, each class
having a long list of specific drugs falling within its scope. The classes are as follows:
opium and its derivatives and compounds; phenanthrene opium alkaloids, their salts,
derivatives, and compounds; coca leaves, their alkaloids, derivatives, extracts or com-
pounds; marijuana, its derivatives or compounds; opiates, their salts, derivatives, and
compounds; pethidine group; methadone group; morphinan group; thiambutene group;
hexamethyleneimine group; miscellaneous group; all parts of the plant of genus
Lophophora, its buttons, alkaloids, and every compound, salt, derivative, mixture, or
preparation of the plant; and any substance which is chemically identical with any
of the substances referred to in the foregoing groups. This listing is contained in
CAL. HEALTH & S.C. § 11001 (West 1964).
. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). ..
"No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use
of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person
licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be the burden
of the defense to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of
violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sen-
tenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the
county jail. The court may place a person convicted hereunder on probation for a
period not to exceed five years and shall in all cases in which probation is granted
require as a condition thereof that such person be confined in the county jail for at
least 90 days. In no event does the court have the power to absolve a person who
violates this section from the obligation. of spending at least 90 days in confinement
in the county jail." Cal. Stats., 1957, ch. 1064, § 1, .p..2343.,
10 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 661 (1962).
11 Id. at 663.
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The United States Supreme Court recognized the broad power
of a state to regulate narcotics traffic within its borders and that
such regulation could take a number of valid forms. 2 However, the
Court noted that the crime of being addicted to the use of narcotics
was a continuing offense involving only a person's status or condi-
tion."3 The trial judge's instruction informed the jury that they
could convict the defendant if they found that the defendant's status
was one of addiction. 14 Since addiction to narcotics was recognized
by the prosecutor to be an illness, the Supreme Court held that a
state law, which imprisoned a person for his addiction, inflicted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution. 5
The question remains whether the Robinson cruel and unusual
analysis prohibits the prosecution of a narcotics addict for mere
possession when he possesses a quantity of narcotics sufficient only
for his daily use. Three California cases answer this question in
the negative, contending that possession represents a separate of-
fense for which the addict can be prosecuted under the state's broad
power to regulate narcotics traffic within its borders.
In People v. Ayala, 6 the defendant was convicted under the
same California statute that the Supreme Court was to rule uncon-
stitutional three years later in Robinson. Since Ayala was also
charged with possession of narcotics, he argued that possession was
a necessarily included offense in his prosecution for addiction and,
consequently, his conviction for addiction barred a prosecution for
possession.' The California court did not accept his reasoning.
Noting that at a given moment a person may have narcotics coursing
through his veins and, at the same time, have an unconsumed
narcotic in his hand,'8 the court reasoned that such possession is
independent of the fact that other narcotics have been consumed
and assimilated into his bloodstream. 9 The court concluded that
the defendant had not been twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense, but had been charged and convicted of two separate offenses;
12 Id. at 664. The various valid forms included sanctions against unauthorized
manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics within a state's
borders; establishment of a compulsory treatment program for the addicted with
penal sanctions for refusal to participate; creation of a program of public education
designed to warn people against the dangers of narcotics; and efforts to ameliorate
the economic and social conditions under which the narcotics traffic might be thought
to flourish. This listing was not intended by the United States Supreme Court to be
exclusive.
18 Id. at '662-63.
14 Id. at 662-63, 665.
15 Id. at 667.
10 167 Cal. App. 2d 49, 334 P.2d 61 (1959).
17 Id. at 51, 334 P.2d at 63.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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namely, addiction to narcotics and being in possession, dominion,
or control of prohibited narcotics.2"
In People v. Zapata,2 defendant Zapata was convicted of
illegal possession of heroin. He argued that he was addicted to
narcotics, that his possession was a product or manifestation of his
compulsive craving for them, and that his possession was of a quan-
tity not large enough to indicate anything but possession for his
own use. He argued that by imprisoning him for possession, the
state was indirectly punishing him for addiction, which was forbid-
den by the Supreme Court in Robinson.22 This court also rejected
the defendant's argument by distinguishing Robinson on the grounds
that it prohibited punishment of a status or affliction and that the
reason for its ruling was the very absence of any conduct at all.23 The
court noted that the Robinson Court recognized the broad power of
a state to regulate narcotics traffic within its borders and that pos-
session was included within that power. Thus, the Zapata court
concluded that the California legislature could punish Zapata for
his possession because it was punishing his act of possession, not
his status as an addict.24
Finally, in People v. Bowens,2s the defendant was arrested
while walking along a sidewalk when members of the narcotics detail
saw him make a suspicious movement with his left hand. A search of
the sidewalk near him uncovered a small bindle of heroin and an
exploration of his arms disclosed fresh scab marks.26 At the trial,
one of the defendant's contentions was that it was unconstitutional
for a state to punish an addict for possession of narcotics in an
amount sufficient only to satisfy the individual's need.27 Once again
a California court refused to accept the defendant's premise. Re-
affirming the broad power of a state to regulate the narcotics traffic
within its borders, Robinson was interpreted as not prohibiting
punishment of an addict for possession, compulsive or voluntary.2"
These three California cases apparently closed the question
of whether Robinson could be extended to forbid punishment of an
addict possessor, who possessed a quantity of narcotics sufficient
only for his own use. The respective courts apparently failed to
20 Id.
21 220 Cal. App. 2d 903, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1963).
22 Id. at 905, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
23 Id. at 906, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
.24 Id. at 907, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
25 229 Cal. App. 2d 590, 40 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1964).
26 Id. at 593-94, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
27 Id. at 601, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
28 Id.
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recognize that conduct impelled by a disease is conduct which is
beyond one's control. Watson v. United States29 reopens this ques-
tion and offers hope to the narcotics addict.
HOPE FOR THE NARCOTICS ADDICT
Watson v. United States was heard twice by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In the first opinion
[Watson I], the court ruled that the federal district court had vio-
lated the Constitution by imposing an excessive mandatory penalty
of ten years for a third offense of narcotics possessionf 0 Yet, in that
opinion, the Court of Appeals did not hold that no punishment could
be given the addict possessor. This question remained open for
further briefing."'
In the second opinion [Watson II], the court recognized that
if Robinson's deployment of the eighth amendment against Cali-
fornia's making addiction a crime meant anything, it must mean
that: "(1) Congress either did not intend to expose the non-traffick-
ing addict possessor to criminal punishment; or (2) its effort to do
so is as unavailing constitutionally as that of the California legisla-
ture."82 However, the court did not resolve the question in those
terms because the record did not clearly show that Watson was a
non-trafficking addict possessor. The court made clear, however,
that the non-trafficking addict possessor, possessing a quantity
sufficient only for his daily habit, could use these arguments in
future litigation. 8
Defendant Watson became addicted to narcotics in a United
States army hospital in Japan during his convalescence from wounds
suffered in the Korean War. When his doctors took him off mor-
phine, a sympathetic nurse slipped him heroin to ease his pain. 4 His
addiction brought him immediately into conflict with the law upon
his return to the United States. Having been twice convicted of nar-
cotics violations, he requested assistance from his parole officer in
obtaining medical aid to prevent further addiction. Accordingly, he
was sent to the United States Public Health Service Hospital at
Lexington, Kentucky, for two years.8 After his release from that
29 No. 21,186 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13, 1968); No. 21,186 ,(D.C. Cir. July 15, 1970).
30 No. 21,186 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13, 1968) [hereinafter referred to as Watson 11.
81 Id. at 20.
82 No. 21,186 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 1970) at 19 [hereinafter referred to as Wat-
son II].
88 Id. at 20-21.
34 Watson I, at 4-5.
85 Id. at 5.
36 Id.
[Vol. 11
COMMENTS
hospital, he studied for the Baptist ministry for nine months and
avoided the use of drugs. When he was no longer able to abstain, he
abandoned his studies and returned to narcotics.87
He was then arrested and convicted of narcotics offenses and
sentenced to the statutory minimum of ten years imprisonment for
narcotics recidivists.8" At the time of Watson's arrest, he was in
possession of 13 capsules of heroin, which amounted to half his
daily intake. At his trial, both the defense and prosecution psychia-
trists stated that the defendant was a narcotics addict. The defense
psychiatrist asserted that Watson's possession of narcotics for his
own use was a direct result of his addiction."
The court in Watson I noted that in Powell v. Texas,40 a major-
ity of Supreme Court Justices were of the opinion that Robinson
prohibited punishment of some conduct performed under the direct
compulsion of a disease, as well as punishment of the disease itself.41
Yet the Powell Court indicated that where a claim of cruel and
unusual punishment rested solely on the premise that the punished
conduct was compelled by the disease, the claimant bore an un-
usually heavy burden of proof. The punishment was constitutionally
invalid only if the defendant was without free will to desist.42 In
s7 Id.
8 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1961); 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1967). Section 174 reads as
follows: "Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any narcotic drug
into the United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction, contrary to
law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation,
concealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug after being imported or brought in,
knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary
to law, or conspires to commit any of such acts in violation of the laws of the United
States, shall be imprisoned not less than five or more than twenty years and, in addi-
tion, may be fined not more than $20,000. For a second or subsequent offense (as
determined under section 7237(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954), the of-
fender shall be imprisoned not less than ten or more than forty years and, in addi-
tion, may be fined not more than $20,000.
"Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have
or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed suffi-
dent evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to
the satisfaction of the jury. For provision relating to sentencing, probation, etc., see
section 7237(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ...
Section 7237(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provided that on a second
or subsequent offense, the sentence would not be suspended nor would probation be
granted. Section 4704(a) reads as follows: "it shall be unlawful for any person to
purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute narcotic drugs except in the original stamped
package or from the original stamped package; and the absence of appropriate tax-
paid stamps from narcotic drugs shall be prima fade evidence of a violation of this
subsection by the person in whose possession the same may be found."
89 Watson I, at 2.
40 392 U.S. 514 (1967).
41 Watson I, at 5.
42 392 U.S. 514, 524-25 (1967). It should be noted that the Powell court did not
hold that if one was without "free will to desist," there could be no punishment of
1970]
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Watson I the court stated that it was clear only that Watson was
unable to abstain permanently from the use of narcotics. Watson
had some freedom of choice not to take drugs at the time of his
arrest. The court found that the record failed to make a clear show-
ing, in light of Powell, of the compulsion necessary to bar any pun-
ishment under the eighth amendment.4"
The court then moved on to the question of whether, even if
his offense was punishable, it was nonetheless unconstitutionally
cruel and unusual punishment to imprison Watson for ten years
without hope of probation or parole. The court cited Weems v.
United States" and stated that both federal and state courts had
accepted that case as establishing the rule that excessiveness, as
well as the mode of punishment, may be unconstitutionally cruel.45
But having accepted this reasoning, the court noted that relatively
few sentences would be so severe in relation to the punished con-
duct as to offend the eighth amendment.46
However, the Watson I court felt that two elements of the
offense of narcotics possession by an addict made its punishment
particularly vulnerable to constitutional scrutiny. In the first place,
the Supreme Court had recognized that narcotics addiction was a
disease and the eighth amendment precluded punishment of the
status of being afflicted with that disease.47 For this reason, the
Watson I court reasoned that "[t]he use and incidental possession
of narcotics are invariable symptoms of addiction. Even if an addict
retains some minimal free will not to indulge at a particular moment
in time, no one would deny that his use of narcotics is largely
involuntary-indeed is the essence of his disease."48
In the second place, mere possession of narcotics was not in
itself a grave offense. Since the principal victim of the criminal act
was the possessor, a severe jail sentence was hardly defensible as an
act of benevolence toward the addict.49 Although the court in Watson
I did not hold that prohibition against use, possession, or purchase
was a constitutionally unreasonable means of controlling the nar-
cotics traffic, the court noted that it "would be less willing to ques-
that person. The court merely said that such a condition would be presumably neces-
sary to warrant such a holding, but that it would not make such a ruling in regard to
chronic alcoholism inasmuch as too little was known about that disease to justify
far-reaching constitutional innovations.
48 Watson I, at 6-7.
44 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910).
45 Watson I, at 8-9.
46 Id. at 11.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 13.
[Vol. 11
COMMENTS
tion Congress's prescribed measure of punishment if the sanctioned
conduct more obviously or more directly threatened the life or limb
or health or property of others."5
The court then went on to point out that technically neither of
the two statutes5' under which the defendant was convicted pro-
scribed possession itself.52 However, the court pointed out that the
presumptions of both statutes converted the defendant's possession
into proof that he illegally "purchased, sold, dispensed, and distrib-
uted" and that he "facilitated the concealment and sale" of a narcotic
drug. 3 Since a defendant who possesses narcotics has either bought
or received them and probably has concealed them, the Watson I
court noted that it was not unreasonable to assume that the posses-
sor has violated some part of the statutes. However, the court then
argued that "an addict's possession of a small amount of narcotics
does not, without more, reasonably support a specific presumption
that he possessed it for purposes of sale, much less that he actually
sold it."54 The court could not ignore the danger that mere posses-
sors would be punished as sellers. Furthermore, ten years in prison
was at least twice as long as the maximum federal sentence for such
major felonies as extortion,55 blackmail,56 perjury,57 assault with a
dangerous weapon,58 arson (not endangering human life), 9 threaten-
ing the life of the President," and selling a man into slavery.
0
' The
Watson I court thus concluded that the punishment was too severe
in its length and in its disregard for Watson's obvious need for treat-
ment. His punishment constituted "cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the eighth amendment."62 The court then left the
final disposition of the case open to further briefing by the parties.
In Watson II, the court noted that no narcotics addict could
realistically possess narcotics without first buying, receiving, or
concealing them and that such acts were inseparable from the
status of addiction.' The Watson II court also restated the proposi-
tion that though the two congressional statutes did not technically
50 Id.
51 See note 38, supra.
52 Watson I, at 14.
58 Id.
54 Id. at 15-16.
55 18 U.S.C. § 872 (1969).
56 Id. § 873.
57 Id. § 1621.
58 Id. §§ 113(c)-(d).
59 Id. § 81.
60 Id. § 871.
61 Id. § 1584.
62 Watson I, at 19-20.
63 Watson II, at 19.
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proscribe possession, nonetheless their presumptions made possible
conviction of the defendant for any one or more of a variety of
prohibited acts by proof of possession alone. The effect was that the
non-addict dealer in large quantities of narcotics was lumped with
the addict who possessed narcotics solely for his own use.64 The
court then stated that if Robinson's deployment of the eighth
amendment as a barrier to California's making addiction a crime
meant anything, it must mean that Congress either did not intend to
subject the addict possessor to criminal punishment, absent evidence
of trafficking, or that its attempt to do so was as constitutionally
invalid as that of the California legislature. 5 The Watson II court
concluded that Robinson "evokes the prospect of the possible con-
stitutional invalidity of those statutes as applied to the non-traffick-
ing addict possessor."66 However, the court refused to resolve the
case in those terms because it could not ignore governmental evi-
dence that the defendant had actually sold heroin four days before
his arrest. For this reason, it was unclear whether Watson actually
fell into the category of a non-trafficking addict possessor. He thus
did not present the kind of record necessary for a court to ad-
judicate a serious issue of statutory construction with constitutional
overtones.67
Hence, while Watson I did not hold that punishment of the
addict possessor was constitutionally impermissible, the Watson II
court saw the Robinson case as evoking the prospect of the con-
stitutional invalidity of the statutes as applied to the non-trafficking
addict possessor.68 Since the California narcotics possession statute
provides for penal sanctions against the addict possessor, the Wat-
son analysis indicates that it too is unconstitutional.
EXTENDING ROBINSON TO IMPELLED CONDUCT
The California narcotics possession statute provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this division, every person who pos-
sesses any narcotic other than marijuana except upon the written pre-
scription of a physician, dentist, podiatrist, or veterinarian licensed to
practice in this State, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for not less than two years nor more than 10 years, and shall not
be eligible for release upon completion of sentence, or on parole, or on
any other basis until he has served not less than two years in prison.69
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 19-20.
67 Id. at 20-21.
68 See note 66, supra.
69 CAL. HEALTu & S.C. § 11500 (West 1964).
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The statute then imposes 5-20 years for a second offense and 15 years
to life for subsequent offenses without any provision for parole or
suspension until the minimum terms have been served."° Thus, had
Watson been prosecuted in California, he would have received at
least 15 years in prison for possession on his third offense. Com-
paring the two statutes with regard to the first two offenses, the
federal statute is more severe than California's since it sets 5-20
years imprisonment for a first offense and 10-40 years for each
subsequent offense.71 In contrast, the California version sets 2-10
years on a first offense and 5-20 years for the second, thus making
it only half as severe.
Although the federal statute is directed at acts of trafficking such
as importing, transporting, and selling, it makes possession a means
of presuming trafficking. On the contrary, the California statute is
aimed only at possession but nonetheless becomes the more severe
statute in terms of its penalties on a third offense in which the
penalty is 15 years to life. Since Watson I condemned the federal
statute as being excessive, it is clear that the California statute,
which provides 15 years to life instead of 10-40 and similarly makes
no provision for parole or suspension, must also be unconstitutional
for excessiveness. Furthermore, Watson II evoked the prospect of
the constitutional invalidity of punishing the non-trafficking addict
possessor because the acts of buying, receiving, and concealing nar-
cotics were inseparable from the status of addiction. In the same
way, possession of narcotics must be inseparable from the status of
addiction. Therefore, California's possession statute is also con-
stitutionally invalid when applied to the non-trafficking addict pos-
sessor.
Two reasons support this conclusion. First, in Powell v. Texas,7"
a majority of the Supreme Court Justices agreed that Robinson
forbade punishment of some conduct performed under the direct
compulsion of a disease. If Watson left the question of Robinson's
extension to the addict possessor open for future litigation, the fact
that a majority of five Supreme Court Justices at one time recog-
nized the validity of that extension would lend credence to that
interpretation. Secondly, since California law provides for non-
punitive treatment of the narcotics addict, it is questionable whether
the California legislature ever intended its possession statute to
cover the addict possessor.
In Powell v. Texas, the defendant Powell was arrested and
TO Id.
71 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1961).
72 392 U.S. 514 (1967).
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charged with being intoxicated in a public place.7" At the trial,
the court made three findings of fact: (1) that chronic alcoholism
was a disease which destroyed the victim's will power to resist the
constant, excessive consumption of alcohol; (2) that a chronic
alcoholic does not appear in public by his own volition but rather
under a compulsion symptomatic of the disease of chronic alcohol-
ism; and (3) that the defendant Powell was a chronic alcoholic.74
Powell then argued that Robinson v. California75 proscribed pun-
ishment of an illness and that he could not be punished for his ill-
ness of chronic alcoholism. But the Supreme Court rejected the
trial court's findings on the grounds that not enough was known
about the disease of alcoholism to make those conclusions,76 and
distinguished the case from Robinson on the grounds that Texas was
punishing the act of being in a public place when intoxicated, rather
than the disease of chronic alcoholism.7 7 One concurring Justice
and four dissenting Justices had a different interpretation of Robin-
son. Mr. Justice White concurred on the ground that Powell had
not shown that his conduct was impelled by his disease because he
had a home and a wife and, hence, was not compelled to drink in a
public place. 78 However, Mr. Justice White argued that Robinson
proscribed punishment of conduct impelled by a disease as well as
the disease itself. He noted that punishing an addict for using drugs
was a conviction for addiction under a different name79 and that
"[u]nless Robinson is to be abandoned, the use of narcotics by an
addict must be beyond the reach of the criminal law."8' 0
Mr. Justice Fortas,8' writing for the four dissenters, argued
that Robinson stood upon the principle that criminal penalties could
not be imposed upon a person for being in a condition he was power-
less to change. 2 Once Robinson had become an addict, he was
powerless to avoid "criminal" conduct for he was unable to choose
73 Id. at 517.
74 Id. at 521.
75 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
76 392 U.S. 514, 521-23 (1967).
77 Id. at 532.
78 Id. at 553-54.
79 Id. at 548.
80 Id. at 548-49.
81 It should be noted that Mr. Justice Fortas is no longer serving on the United
States Supreme Court. Hence, one does not know how the present Supreme Court
stands on this question. However, Powell v. Texas represents the most recent case in
which the Supreme Court dealt with the question; and in that case, a majority of
the Justices felt that Robinson forbade punishment of some conduct performed under
the compulsion of a disease. The fellow Justices who dissented with Mr. Justice
Fortas in that case are Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice
Stewart.
82 392 U.S. 514, 567 (1967).
[Vol. I11
COMMENTS
not to violate the criminal law. Mr. Justice Fortas read the trial
court's findings to mean that Powell was powerless to avoid drink-
ing; that having taken a first drink, he had an uncontrollable com-
pulsion to drink to the point of intoxication, and that once intoxi-
cated, he could not prevent himself from appearing in public
places.88 Accepting the findings of the trial judge, Mr. Justice Fortas
argued that they called into play the principle that a person may
not be punished if the condition essential to constitute the defined
crime is part of the pattern of his disease and is occasioned by a
compulsion symptomatic of the disease.84 This principle is supported
by the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment as the Court construed that command in Robinson."s
For this reason, the four Justices felt that it was cruel and unusual
punishment to punish Powell for being intoxicated in a public place
when his public appearance was compelled by his disease.
8
"
Clearly then, the four dissenting Justices all upheld the view
that Robinson stood for more than punishment of a mere disease;
that it also stood for the proposition that any conduct performed
under the direct compulsion of a disease also came within the scope
of Robinson and, hence, could not be punished.87 Therefore, since
the court in Watson H explicitly recognized that buying, receiving,
and concealing narcotics were acts realistically inseparable from
the status of addiction,88 possession of narcotics by a narcotics
addict is a symptom of his disease as long as he possesses them in an
amount consistent with his daily use, absent evidence of sale or
trafficking. If Robinson v. California89 forbids punishment of con-
duct impelled by disease as well as disease itself, then California's
narcotics possession statute is unconstitutional by reason of cruel
and unusual punishment when applied to the addict in possession of
a quantity sufficient only for his own use as long as there is no
evidence of trafficking.
88 Id. at 567-68.
84 Id. at 569.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 569-70.
87 One might ask if the prohibition against punishment of some conduct com-
pelled by one's disease extends to conduct such as stealing or even killing to obtain
needed drugs. On the contrary, such conduct is further removed from the disease of
narcotics addiction and is not inherently a part of that disease. In contrast, the
possession and use of narcotics are inherently a part of the disease of narcotics addic-
tion since they are essential prerequisites to fulfilling a need for narcotics. There-
fore, possession and use arguably fall within conduct impelled by the disease of
narcotics addiction whereas murder and larceny are further removed from the disease
and may not be constitutionally protected by Robinson.
88 Watson I, at 19
89 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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PROBLEMS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In addition, perhaps the California legislature never intended
that its narcotics possession statute be applied to the narcotics
addict. Certainly, California's policy toward narcotics addicts is
inconsistent with the idea of punishment for possession. The legisla-
ture states that "[t]he rehabilitation of narcotics addicts and the
prevention of continued addiction to narcotics is a matter of state-
wide concern."'9 The legislature continues this theme in another
statute:
It is the intent of the Legislature that persons addicted to narcotics,
or who by reason of repeated use of narcotics are in imminent danger
of becoming addicted, shall be treated for such condition and its under-lying causes, and that such treatment shall be carried out for non-
punitive purposes not only for the protection of the addict, or personin imminent danger of addiction, against himself, but also for the pre-
vention of contamination of others and the protection of the public.91
In California, if a judge determines that an individual charged
with a crime is a narcotics addict or is in imminent danger ofbecoming one, he may suspend the criminal proceedings and certify
the defendant to superior court to determine whether he is in fact
addicted.92 If the superior court determines that he is addicted, it
may commit the defendant to the custody of the Director of Correc-
tions for confinement in a rehabilitation facility until he is dis-
charged.8 Upon his discharge, he is returned to the court of
original jurisdiction for disposition of his criminal charges. That
court may dismiss the charges against him, but if it does not dismiss
them, any sentence imposed is credited with the amount of time the
addict spent in the rehabilitation facility.94
California also makes provision for those addicts not charged
with a crime. Any person who believes that someone is addicted to
narcotics or is in danger of becoming addicted may report that
information to the district attorney, who then may petition the
superior court to confine the addict in a rehabilitation facility.95 Any
policeman or health officer, who has probable cause to believe that
a person is addicted to narcotics or is in danger of becoming
addicted, may take that person to the county hospital or to another
suitable medical facility for examination.9 6 The physician in charge
may admit such person to the hospital upon the written application
90 CAL. HEALTH & S.C. § 11728 (West 1964).
91 CAL. WELTF. & INST'NS CODE § 3000 (West 1966).
92 Id. §§ 3050-51.
93 Id.
94 Id. § 3200.
95 Id. § 3100.
96 Id. § 3100.6.
[Vol. I1I
COMMENTS
of the policeman or health officer and must conduct an examination
of the person within 24 hours to determine whether he is addicted to
narcotics. If the physician finds him to be addicted, he reports that
fact to the district attorney who then may petition the superior
court for the addict's commitment9 7 Thus, the narcotics possession
statute is really not necessary to rehabilitate the narcotics addict
since California makes provision for him before he commits a crime.
These rather extensive provisions indicate that the California
legislature has given considerable attention to the problem of the
narcotics addict and wishes to rehabilitate him constructively rather
than to punish him destructively. However, the continued enforce-
ment of California's possession statute against the addict possessor
not only raises grave constitutional doubts, but also acts as an obsta-
cle to the fulfillment of California's commitment to "the rehabilita-
tion of narcotics addicts"9 and their "nonpunitive treatment."
99
Thus, in light of the express legislative policy of this state, and the
inherently punitive nature of incarcerating the addict for possession,
the California legislature may never have intended its narcotics pos-
session statute to apply to the narcotics addict, possessing a quantity
of narcotics sufficient only for his daily use and absent evidence of
trafficking.
For this reason, California courts must view the specific pro-
visions for "nonpunitive treatment"' and "rehabilitation"'
1 1 as
being controlling over the general provision punishing for possession
of narcotics. As a rule of statutory construction, California case
law provides that:
[A] general provision is controlled by one that is special, the latter
being treated as an exception to the former. A specific provision relat-
ing to a particular subject will govern in respect to that subject, as
against a general provision, although the latter, standing alone, would
be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular
provision relates1
.0 2
The California statutes providing for "nonpunitive treatment"'
0° and
7 Id.
98 CAL. HEALTH & S.C. § 11728 (West 1964).
99 CAL. WEaL. & INST'NS CODE § 3000 (West 1966).
100 Id.
101 See note 98, supra.
102 Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 723-24; 123 P.2d 505, 512 (1942). See also
Escondido v. Municipal Court, 253 Cal. App. 2d 801, 61 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1967); Cum-
mings v. California State Teachers Retirement Bd., 241 Cal. App. 2d 149, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 391 (1966); People v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 2d 303, 18 Cal. Rptr. 557
(1962); People v. Perez, 198 Cal. App. 2d 460, 18 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1961); Richardson
v. San Diego, 193 Cal. App. 2d 648, 14 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1961); People v. Wood, 161
Cal. App. 2d 24, 325 P.2d 1014 (1958).
103 See note 99, supra.
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"rehabilitation of narcotics addicts"'10 4 are special provisions relating
to California's policy in regard to narcotics addiction. On the con-
trary, California's narcotics possession statute is a general pro-
vision which punishes every person found in possession of narcotics,
regardless of whether that person is addicted to narcotics. 05 Under
the rule of statutory construction just quoted, the special pro-
visions for "nonpunitive treatment" and "rehabilitation" must be
"treated as an exception"'0 6 to the general statute punishing for
possession. Thus, California courts should construe the narcotics
possession statute as being inapplicable to the narcotics addict
because the special California provisions relating to "nonpunitive
treatment" and "rehabilitation" create an exception to the general
provision relating to punishment for narcotics possession.
CONCLUSION
A narcotics addict must continuously violate the law in acquir-
ing and possessing a quantity of drugs consistent only with his daily
use. This conduct, though proscribed by statute, is a necessary part
of his disease. As noted by both the Watson courts, the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment for-
bids the imposition of the criminal sanction for such acts.
The addict possessor, as any other person suffering from a grave
illness, requires humane treatment aimed at his cure and eventual
rehabilitation. Incarceration not only violates the specific mandate
of the Constitution, but also frustrates all constructive efforts to
adequately treat the severe social problem of narcotics addiction.
Joseph P. Kennedy
104 See note 98, supra.
105 See note 69 and accompanying text, supra.
106 See note 102 and accompanying text, supra.
